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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

CaseNo.20010686-CA

DANA WAGENMAN,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction entered on a conditional guilty plea to
possession/use of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2001).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issue presented on appeal has three subparts, all involving the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss, and all governed by the same
standard of appellate review:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A. Did the trial court properly find that the original trial date of June 4,
2001, fell within the 120-day detainer period triggered by the filing of defendant's
request for disposition under Utah's speedy trial statute?
B. Did the trial court properly determine that "good cause" existed to

^

continue the trial in this matter to the next available date because, on the date
originally set for trial, another matter had priority over the instant case?
C. Did the trial court properly determine that "good cause" existed to
continue the trial a second time where the court's unilateral continuance of the first
setting occasioned the unavailability of the State's key witness on the second setting?

*

The trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute under the
detainer statute is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Peterson. 2002 UT App
53, f 5,42 P.3d 1258; State v. Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, fl 3-4, 34 P.3d 790, cert.
denied. 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002). This Court reviews the underlying legal conclusions
i
for correctness and the factual findings for clear error. Peterson. 2002 UT App 53, f 5;
Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, fl 3-4. The attribution of delay to a party is a factual
finding, reviewed for correctness. Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, % 4, n.4; State v.

A

Pathammavong. 860 P.2d 1001,1004 (Utah App. 1993). The determination of the
existence of "good cause" under the speedy trial statute is a legal conclusion reviewed for
correctness. See State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911.915 (Utah 1998).

I
2
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutory provision is relevant to the issue on appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999) (in Add. A).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND UNDISPUTED FACTS
Because the chronology of the proceedings in this matter is critical in applying
Utah's statute on speedy trial rights, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), the relevant dates
and corresponding undisputed facts are presented as follows:1
12/26/00

Defendant is arrested and taken into custody (R. 103). She is detained
without bail in the Utah State Prison pursuant to parole hearings relating to
her previous parole status (id).

01/18/01

Defendant signs a "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending
Charge(s)" ["disposition notice"] (R. 3) (in Add. B).

01 /26/01

The information is filed in the Fourth District Court (R. 2-1 ).2

1/30/01

A summons is issued for defendant's arrest (R. 7,102).

02/01/01

The authorized agent in the records unit at the prison receives the
disposition notice (R. 3,102). Add. B. The prison sends copies of the
notice and additional statutorily-required information to the prosecutor and
the district court the same day (R. 5-3) (in Add. B).

l

A statement of the facts underlying the charges filed against defendant does not
appear in this record. Moreover, the facts surrounding the offenses are not relevant to a
determination of the issue raised on appeal.
2

Because the pleadings file is numbered from back to front in this case, citations to
the record will reflect the reverse numerical order (i.e., R. 2-1).
The docket shows that the information was filed January 26 (R. 87). However, the
court's stamp on the information reflects January 25 (R. 2-1).

3
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02/08/01

The district court files the disposition notice (R. 87).

02/14/01

Defendant is served with a summons (R. 6).

03/01/01

The initial appearance occurs, and counsel is appointed for defendant (R.
11-10, 102). A waiver hearing is set for 3/9/01 (R. 10, 102).3

03/07/01

Defense counsel withdraws due to a conflict (R. 16, 85).

03/09/01

New counsel enters his appearance (R. 18, 85). A waiver hearing occurs
and a preliminary hearing is set for 3/30/01 (R. 23-21, 85, 102).

03/30/01

A preliminary hearing occurs at which defendant is represented by an
associate of her counsel (R. 29-27, 85-84, 102; Br. of Aplt. at 4).4 The
court finds probable cause on both counts and binds defendant over (id.).
During the course of the proceedings, defendant requests an additional
setting before the court so that defendant's counsel of record may be
present; the trial court grants the request (R. 102; R. 122: 5, 9-10).
Defendant enters not guilty pleas, and the matter is continued to 4/13/01 so
that defense counsel may appear (id.).

04/13/01

Defense counsel appears, and a one-day jury trial is set for June 4, 2001 (R.
35-30, 102-03).

05/31/01

The docket reflects that the court sua sponte cancels the jury trial setting
because of "a high priority case" (R. 83, 101). There is no record evidence
of any hearing.

06/13/01

Defense counsel files a motion to withdraw because defendant's family has
retained private counsel (R. 74).

06/14/01

The jury trial is rescheduled for June 25, 2001 (R. 76, 101).

3

The trial court explained that a waiver hearing is "a hearing conducted to
determine whether a preliminary hearing will be conducted" (R. 102).
4

The State's copy of defendant's opening brief was not paginated. For citation
purposes, the State has added page numbers to the brief, starting with the page containing
the citation for this Court's appellate jurisdiction.

4
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06/19/01

Defendant, through new counsel, files a motion to dismiss the information
based on an alleged violation of her statutory speedy trial right under Utah
Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999) (R. 92-77).

06/20/01

Present counsel for defendant enters his appearance (R. 94).

06/21/01

The second trial date is cancelled at the State's request because the key
witness was unavailable on June 25 (R. 122:3; docket at 6).

06/25/01

A hearing is held on defendant's motion to dismiss, and the court hears oral
argument (R. 97-95; R. 122: 1-9). The court denies the motion and sets the
trial for July 25, 2001 (R. 97-95; R. 9-11).

07/25/01

The trial court enters its written order denying defendant's motion to
dismiss (R. 103-100) (in Add. D).

07/25/01

A change of plea hearing is held in lieu of trial (R. 115-13). Defendant
enters a conditional guilty plea illegal possession/use of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony, pursuant to a plea bargain, and the
remaining misdemeanor count is dismissed (R. 115-04, 2-1).5 Defendant
requests immediate sentencing, and the court sentences her to an
indeterminate prison term of zero-to-five years, to be served concurrently
with a sentence she is already serving (R. 115-13).

08/08/01

Defendant files a timely "Notice of Appeal" (R. 117-16).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

Once an incarcerated defendant has properly delivered a written request for
disposition of charges to custodial authorities at the prison, the prosecutor must bring
defendant to trial within 120 days or suffer dismissal of the charges identified in the
disposition request. The time period may be tolled or temporarily waived by defendant or
extended for "good cause" as determined by the trial court.

5

See State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah App. 1988).
5
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(

In this case, the trial court held that the original trial setting of June 4, 2001, fell
within the 120-day period because the period, which would have expired on May 29, was
extended by fourteen days due to delay attributable to defendant alone. The court then
ruled that its unilateral rescheduling of the trial to June 25, 2001, was based on "good

(

cause" under the statute where another case, also set for trial on June 4, was a "higher
priority" than the instant case. Finally, the trial court held that because the rescheduling
i
of the trial from June 4 rendered a key state's witness unavailable, "good cause" existed
to reschedule the trial a second time to the earliest available date. Defendant
acknowledges her responsibility for the fourteen-day delay, fails to establish any error in
the trial court's computation of the statutory period, and does not establish any error in the
trial court's legal conclusions relating to the "good cause" determinations. Consequently,

^

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss for a
violation of the speedy trial statute.
i
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS, FINDING NO VIOLATION OF
DEFENDANT'S STATUTORY SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT

<

Defendant contends that the trial court erred by setting the initial trial date outside
the statutory 120-day period provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), and then
moving it to an even later date thereafter. Br. of Aplt. at 6-12. First, she argues that the
statutory period expired on May 29, 2001, making the June 4 trial setting untimely. Id. at
<

6
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7-8, 10. Second, she argues that even if the June 4 setting was valid, there was no "good
cause" to move the trial date from June 4 to June 25. Id. at 8-12. Finally, she claims that
the final change in trial dates, from June 25 to July 25, was occasioned solely by the
prosecutor, was not supported by "good cause," and should not have occurred. Id.
Section 77-29-1 provides:
(1)
Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the
state prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and
there is pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or
information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or
custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written
demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is
pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be
entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of
delivery of written notice.
(2)
Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the
demand described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to
be forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt
requested, to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The
warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting
attorney so notified, provide the attorney with such information concerning
the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3)
After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection
(1), the prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause
shown in open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be
granted any reasonable continuance.
(4)
In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days,
or within such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his
counsel moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding.
If the court finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the
matter heard within the time required is not supported by good cause,
whether a previous motion for continuance was made or not, the court shall
order the matter dismissed with prejudice.

7
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(

Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999). Add. A. The purpose of section 77-29-1 is "to
protect the constitutional right of prisoners to a speedy trial and to prevent those charged
with enforcement of criminal statutes from holding over the head of a prisoner
undisposed charges against him." See State v. Truiillo. 656 P.2d 403,404-05 (Utah

<

1982) (citing purpose of predecessor statute); accord State v. Viles. 702 P.2d 1175, 1176
(Utah 1985) (citing purpose of section 77-29-1 in similar terms); see also State v. Wilson,
1
22 Utah 2d 361, 362,453 P.2d 158, 159 (1969) (citing purpose of predecessor statute).
The burden of complying with the statute rests with the prosecutor. State v.
Heaton, 958 P.2d-911, 915 (Utah 1998). Once a prisoner has delivered a disposition
request, "the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter heard
within the statutory period." Id Thus, a defendant need not even object to a trial setting

^

that falls outside the required time period. Id.; accord State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421,
424 (Utah 1991). Instead, the prosecutor must "notify the court that a detainer notice has
i
been filed," and he must otherwise "make a good faith effort to comply with the statute."
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915. Finally, a finding of "good cause" means: "(1) delay caused by
the defendant—such as asking for a continuance; or (2) 'a relatively short delay caused by

*

unforseen problems arising immediately prior to trial.'" State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App
281,16, 34 P.3d 790 (quoting Petersen, 810 P.2d at 426 (footnote omitted)), cert, denied,
42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002).

4
8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A.

The June 4 Setting was Within the 120-Dav Statutory Period
This Court must first determine "'when the 120-day period commenced and when

it expired.'" State v. Peterson. 2002 UT App 53, f 6,42 P.3d 1258 (quoting Heaton, 958
P.2d at 916). The expiration date is affected by delays caused by the defendant, which
toll the running of the 120-day period. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) to (4); Peterson.
2002 UT App 53,1f 6.
In this case, defendant concedes that the trial court properly found that the 120-day
period commenced upon the delivery of the Detainer notice to the prison on February 1,
2001 (R. 102). Br. of Aplt. at 7. Uninterrupted, the 120-day period would have expired
on May 29, 2001, as defendant notes. Id at 7-8. However, the trial court properly found
that the time did not run uninterrupted (R. 122: 9-10) (transcript attached in Add. C). At
the preliminary hearing on March 30, defendant appeared with someone other than his
counsel of record (R. 29-27, 85-84, 102). Before the close of the hearing, defendant
sought and obtained a hearing on April 13 to permit his counsel of record to appear (R.
29-27, 85-84). At the subsequent hearing, defense counsel simply sought and obtained a
trial date (R. 35-30). The fourteen-day delay in setting the trial after the preliminary
hearing was occasioned solely by defendant, and, absent that delay, the trial court
reasonably would have been able to schedule the trial earlier on its calendar. The trial
court ruled that this delay tolled the running of the statutory period (R. 122:9-10). Add. C.

9
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(

Defendant admits that this delay "may arguably be attributed" to herself, and that it
would toll the 120-day period, moving the expiration date to June 11. Br. of Aplt. at 10.
In actuality, the fourteen-day delay would move the expiration date to June 12 (a calendar
is attached in Add. E for the Court's convenience). Defendant presents no argument that

^

the delay should be attributed to anyone but herself, and does not challenge the trial
court's finding on this point. Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that the
I
120-day statutory period expired on June 12, and the June 4 trial setting fell well within
the time for bringing defendant to trial. See State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, f 49, 37 P.3d
1073 (appellate court used unchallenged findings as partial support for the validity of the

'

challenged search), reh'g denied (Jan. 3, 2002). Hence, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in rejecting defendant's motion to dismiss with respect to the initial trial

.

setting.
B.

The Continuance to June 25 was Supported by "Good Cause"
I
A trial may be set outside the expiration of the statutory time period, provided

"good cause" exists to excuse the delay. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) to
(4);Heaton, 958 P.2dat 916. "If the court finds that the failure of the prosecuting

<

attorney to have the matter heard within the time required is not supported by good cause,
whether a previous motion for continuance was made or not, the court shall order the
matter dismissed with prejudice." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4). Add. A.

i
10
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The jury trial in this case did not occur on June 4, as was initially scheduled,
because the trial court unilaterally continued this case "to hear State v. Kris Montova,
case No. 001402774" (R. 101). The record reflects that Montova was "a high priority
case" which the trial court determined required that it be heard before this case (R. 83; R.
122: 10-11). Consequently, the trial court held that there was "good cause" under the
speedy trial statute to continue the trial in this case to the next available date (R. 122: 1011). Add.C.
Defendant contends that there was no "good cause" to continue the trial date
because Montova should not have been given priority over her case. She claims that
Montoya was not in custody, as was defendant, that no detainer notice had been filed in
Montova. as was done here, and that there was no urgency to hear that case in lieu of this
one. Br. ofAplt. at 8, 10-11.
However, defendant's assertions have no record support. Instead, they appear to
be conclusions she has drawn from the court docket in Montova, which'she has appended
to her brief. However, that docket is not part of the record in this case, and defendant
makes no request that judicial notice be taken of the docket and no argument establishing
that judicial notice is appropriate. See Finlavson v. Finlavson, 874 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah
App. 1994) (explaining the limited circumstances under which an appellate court will
take judicial notice of a fact); see also State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 236 n.7 (Utah App.
1998) (acknowledging, but not exercising, the ability to take judicial notice of facts on

11
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<

appeal), rev'd on other grounds. 1999 UT 108, 992 P.2d 986. Consequently, this Court
should strike defendant's addendum and refuse to consider the information therein.
Moreover, the docket does not support defendant's claims. It does not establish
that no detainer notice was filed with the prison authorities in that case, whether Montoya

i

was incarcerated at the time of trial on June 4, 2001, or whether there was any "urgency"
requiring that Montoya be given higher priority than this case. Neither does it provide
i
insight into the trial judge's reasoning behind his determination that Montoya was a
higher priority case than this case. There are a myriad of considerations for a judge to
make in every case, not all of them obvious on the stark pages of a court docket. These
considerations remain a valuable tool in the administration of justice. See Trujillo, 656
P.2d at 405 (speculation by the trial judge as to the possible reasons for a change in trial

4

dates on the morning of trial due to co-defendant's last-minute change of plea support the
court's determination that "good cause" existed under the speedy trial statute for a
i
continuance of the trial beyond the expiration of the statutory period). This trial judge
was intimately familiar with the procedural and legal posture of both cases, the claims
made and the rights at issue in each, the age of the respective cases, and the status of the

'

court's own calendar. With this knowledge, the judge determined that the proper course
of action was to reschedule this matter twenty-one days later. Nothing in this record

.

reveals this determination to be anything but reasonable and practical under the

<

12
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circumstances. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917 (extending a timely trial date one month
beyond the expiration of the statutory period for proper reasons constitutes good cause).
Further, this court should presume the correctness of the challenged ruling. While
defendant has no responsibility under section 77-29-1 to ensure a timely trial once she
properly files her detainer notice, she maintains the burden of providing adequate record
support for her appellate claims. She has not met this responsibility as she wholly failed
to create the necessary record below. See State v. Snvder. 932 P.2d 120, 130-31 (Utah
App. 1997) (noting defendant's duty to support his appellate allegations with an adequate
record in order to obtain appellate review); see also State v. Wetzel. 868 P.2d 64, 67
(Utah 1993). Defendant did not seek any explanation from the trial judge for the priority
determination and did not give the judge an opportunity to elaborate on its reasoning by
objecting to the continuance. As defendant failed to create the record necessary to
support her appellate claim and to permit appellate review, this Court should presume the
correctness of the proceedings below. See Snyder, 932 P.2d at 130-31 (presuming the
correctness of the trial court proceedings in the absence of an adequate appellate record).
Moreover, while the question of whether the prosecutor was responsible for the
delay is not dispositive of whether "good cause" existed, see Heaton. 958 P.2d at 915, it is
important to note that the prosecutor had no reasonable opportunity to act to prevent the
continuance of the initial trial setting in this case. The record is devoid of any mention of
a hearing, a phone conference, or any other contact between the court and the prosecutor,
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suggesting that the delay occasioned by the trial court's priority decision occurred without
any apparent opportunity for the prosecutor or defendant to provide input for or against
the decision. It was a decision made by the trial court without input from either party.
Consequently, this is not a situation, as in Heaton, where the prosecutor did "nothing

^

whatsoever" to timely bring the case to trial. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916. On the contrary,
the prosecutor had a timely trial date and was prepared to proceed, but was prevented by
i
the court from meeting his responsibility under the statute. Once the initial trial date was
lost, it is not likely that the prosecutor could have had the matter timely set in the eight
days remaining in the statutory period; defendant makes no contrary assertion. The trial

*

judge noted that he had to push to get such an early second setting, putting the trial only
thirteen days outside the statutory period (R. 122: 10-11). Add. C. Accordingly,

.

dismissal of the charges as a result of the rescheduling of the trial date at the next
available setting would be unconscionably harsh on the State and would result in a
I
windfall for defendant.
Q.

The Continuance to July 25 was Supported by "Good Cause"
On June 25, the parties appeared for a hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss

<

and for the scheduled jury trial (R. 97-95; R. 122: 1-9). At that time, the prosecutor
explained to the court that, when told of the new trial date, one of his two key witnesses
notified him that he was leaving town for a long-planned family vacation out of state and
would not be available at the June 25 setting (R. 122: 8). Add. C. That witness had been
<
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subpoenaed and had arranged his schedule to be available for the June 4 trial setting (id.).
Consequently, the prosecutor sought a continuance, arguing that the absence of a key
witness under the circumstances of this case constituted "good cause" under the speedy
trial statute for a continuance (id).
Defendant notes that the prosecutor did not subpoena the witness a second time for
the June 25 trial setting (R. 122: 6). Br. of Aplt. at 8, 11-12. She contends that the
prosecutor's duty under the speedy trial statute requires that he subpoena his witnesses at
all costs, and that his failure to do so does not constitute "good cause" because it would
defeat his "constitutional and statutory speedy trial right." Br. of Aplt. at ll. 6
The trial court acknowledged the absence of a subpoena, but found that "good
cause" for the continuance still existed under the specific circumstances of this case (R.
122: 9-11). Add. C. The judge noted that in ninety percent of the cases in which
subpoenas had not been served on witnesses, "good cause" would likely not be found to
warrant continuation of a trial (R. 122:11). Add. C. However, under the totality of the
circumstances in this case, including the earlier delay caused by defendant and the lastminute moving of the June 4 trial date necessitated by Montova, the judge ruled that the

defendant's brief contains no constitutional speedy trial right argument. As she
did not advance such an argument below or on appeal, this Court need only address the
statutory right. See, e ^ , State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 37, 39 n.l (Utah 1996), abrogated on
other grounds bv State v. Litherland. 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Webb. 779 P.2d
1108, 1111 n.4 (Utah 1989). Consequently, the State addresses only the statutory speedy

trial right.
15
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absence of an un-subpoenaed key witness constituted "good cause" and warranted the
granting of a continuance (R. 122: 10-11). Add. C.

*

The trial court's rationale was appropriate. It was not the lack of a subpoena that
caused the need for a continuance. It was the last-minute rescheduling of the

^

trial—without any possibility for input from the prosecutor—that occasioned the witness'
unavailability. As the prosecutor noted, the witness had long-since scheduled his family's
i

vacation around the June 4 trial setting to make himself available to the court and the
parties on that date (R. 122: 8). Add. C. That setting was made at the hearing on April
13—nearly two months earlier (R. 35-30,102-03). The last-minute rescheduling of the

*

trial only twenty-one days beyond the first setting—especially during the early summer
vacation, high-density travel period involved here—provided insufficient time to
realistically expect the witness to reschedule his family vacation, if at all possible, without
major difficulty and expense. Continuance to the next available date was entirely
reasonable and practical under these circumstances.

'

i

i
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^day of August, 2002.
MARK SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
7/

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee were mailed by first class mail, postage prepaid, to Shelden R. Carter, Harris &
Carter, attorneys for defendant, 3325 North University Ave., Suite 200, Jamestown
Square, Clocktower Bldg., Provo, Utah 84604, this / /day of August, 2002.
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UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
1953

VOLUME 8B
1999 REPLACEMENT

Titles 76 and 77

77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continuance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for
failure to bring to trial.
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified,
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any
reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with
prejudice.
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• b T A H DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF PgunTMn CHARGE(S)

TO:

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS

Notice i s hereby g i v e n t h a t I , r^JMy\fl i ^ V ¥ ^ / y Y H / ^
(Inmate Name) do hereby request f i n ^ i dispo^jjbion. Charge (s) of
are now
pending against
(jrefyiC
pending
against me
me ii n
n the
the Ty\J^JIrfr\
\\\^r[w\
t^nJTy\CJT^
Court,
brought by*
^Q
tbC
(prosecuting
agency e . g . , cou&ty, ' c i t y , Attorney General, etc. in the State of
Utah) and request is hereby made that you forward this notice to
the appropriate authorities together with such information as
required by law.

Dated this ffo day of

Inmate's Name

j 7 01

(Month / Year) .

QtOL^Ilh^^

USP#

^ffolQ

**•******•*••***•*••*••*•************•****•**•******•************

I hereby certify
ha^ve t received a copy of
of the foregoing
tify that I have
notice this ]_ day of
<AjL^r' Ol (Month / Year) .

Authorized Ageiit, DIO Record Unit
USP, PO Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020
-6UCF, PO Doit 000, Ounnioon, Utah Bilfiiia

w

->

(Revised 10/2000)
(TMF 05/05.06,0
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DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS

4 ' » D'STP.i;
STATE

JjTA i

Michael O. Leavitt
Governor

H. L. Haun
Executive Director

Scott V. Carver
Division Director

FEB evUzuAH'OI

P.O Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
Phone: (801) 576-7470
FAX: (801)576-7473

1 February 2001

DIVISION* «?
Utah County District Attorney
100 E. Center Street #2100
Provo, UT
84606

RE: WAGENMAN, Dana
USP# 26736
D.O.B. 06/26/72
YOUR, CASE # UNKNOWN
Dear Sirs:
MR/MRS/MS Dana Wagenman is currently incarcerated in the Utah
State Prison. He/She is requesting disposition of untried charges
of Illegal possession of control substance, pending in your
jurisdiction. Enclosed is the appropriate paperwork to process
his request.
Thank you for your assistance with this matter.
Sincerely,
Mr. Scott Carver, Director
Institutional Operations

1\ rtu.i B utilted, y
IST: "TCary %B r d c k b r a c l e r
R e c o r d s & ID O f f i c e r
Encl.

cc:

(2)

Fourth District Court Clerk-Provo
Inmate File
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

CERTIFICATE OF INMATE STATUS
120-DAY DISPOSITION
TO:
RE:

fourth District Court CLerk- Provo
WAGENMAN, Dana
Inmate Name

26736
USP#

TERM of COMMITMENT: Poss/use controlled substance 0-5; Dist/arrange
dist cont substance 0-5/1-15; poss/use controlled substance 0-5;
distrib/arrangp cont substaince 0-5; Absconding 1 yr; Poss w/ intent
to distrib controlled substance 1-15/0-5
TIME SERVED

Approx. 03 year(s) 05 mo
Approx. 11 year(s) 08 mo

TIME REMAINING:

PAROLE ELIGIBILITY

Scheduled for 00-00-0000

BOARD OF PARDONS DECISION
DECISION

Scheduled parole expire 00/00/0000

Hearing date set for 00/00/0000

Mr. Scott Carver, Director
Institutional Operations

Authori zed A^ent., -DIP Record Unit
Utah State Prison
P. 0. Box 250, Draper, UT
84020
cc: file
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2W> F'r --

U:V

-1-

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORIGINAL

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 011400381 FS
vs.
DANA WAGENMAN,
Defendant.

Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
June 25, 2001
BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE GARY D. STOTT
Fourth District Court Judge

For the Plaintiffs

Jeffrey R. Buhman
Utah County Dpty. Atty.
100 E. Center #2100
Provo, UT 84606Telephone: (801)370-8026

For the Respondent:

Shelden Carter
CARTER, PHILLIPS & WILKINSON
3325 N. University Ave. #200
Provo, UT 84604
Telephone: (801)375-9801

Transcribed by:

Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT

1771 SOUTH CALIFORNIA AVENUE
PROVO, UTAH 84606
TELEPHONE: (801)377-0027

FILED

Utah'fV ^T^-*-*
UOUrt
Of Appeals

MAR 212002
fautettestagg
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on June 25, 2001)

3

THE COURT:

4

defendant is present.

5

MR. CARTER:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. CARTER:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. CARTER:

10
11

Next is State vs. Dana Wagenman.

THE COURT:

Mr. Carter, good morning, sir.
Good morning, Judge.
How you doing?
Good.

Fishing?
No, I took all the kids and we went to

California and played for a few days.
MR. CARTER:

13

THE COURT:

No, sir.

14

MR. CARTER:

Good.

15

THE COURT:

You didn't go to Disneyland, did you?

No, I don't need that hectic stuff.

MR. CARTER:

18

THE COURT:
come back to reality.

20

MR. BUHMAN:

That sounds good.
We had a good time and now we're ready to
Give me a dose of reality/ Mr. Carter.
Your Honor, I think I should probably

21

address this one.

22

4th, and I believe that it was June 4th.

23

trial for a different trial —

24

So—

25

We

just played at the beach and played different things*--

17 I

19

How was the vacation?

It was terrific.

12

16

The

Your Honor, this was set for trial on June

THE COURT:

The Court bumped this

I'm not sure which one it was.

Reset it for today.
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-3MR. BUHMAN:

Reset it today.

My main witness —

have two AP&P agents who are my witnesses in this case.

I
My

main one is Kendall Joy, who is in California at Disneyland on
vacation with his family.
THE COURT:

I should have found him, Mr. Carter.

MR. CARTER:

Your fault, Judge.

MR. BUHMAN:

The complication in this case is that

Ms. Wagenman has filed a 120-day disposition, and the June 4th
trial date actually would have been outside that window but for
a setting by the defendants awhile ago.

So Mr. Carter has

filed a motion on that, and I don't know if the Court wants to
just address that.

I think the issue is relatively simple, or

if the Court wants to set it for hearing, whatever the Court
would like to do.
THE COURT:

Well, I've got his motion.

response from you, a written response.

I don't have a

If you do want to file

a written response you're entitled to do so.
MR. BUHMAN:
just argue it.

I could do that, your Honor, or I could

I think that the issue is really quite clear.

The law is very simple on this issue.
THE COURT:
MR. CARTER:
THE COURT:

Do you want to address it now, gentlemen?
That's fine with us, your Honor.
Ms. Wagenman, why don't you have a seat

right back there at the table, please.
MR. CARTER:

Go ahead.

Judge, this case originates on December
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-427th of 2000.

It originates by an arrest by Adult Probation

and Parole acting as police officers up on this matter by a
Kendall Joy, who is a probation officer, and I'm advised, a
Category I police officer.
detained.

Ms. Wagenman is arrested and she is

She is brought before the Court the next day.
She is held there and held in jail pending the county

filing charges on her.

They set it over, I think, for a

following week to see if those charges are ready to be filed.
Apparently, by the review of the record, it appears that the
charges are not —

or the county attorney is not ready to

proceed upon that time.

That would place us in the first part

of January.
Ms. Wagenman is on parole, and so when the parole
agency gets a hold of this information, they have a parole
hearing and they take her back to prison.

She has been there

since that time.
On January 18th of 2001 Ms. Wagenman issues a 120-day
disposition.

That's received by the prison.

noted as being received on February 1, 2001.

I think that's
That same day the

prison sends out notification to the county attorney's office
of this 120-day disposition.

There's also a document within

the file suggesting that that was sent on February 1st, and
maybe it was received somewhere around that date.
As I reviewed the record, it appears that the case was
finally filed by the county attorneys on January 26, 2001.
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A

-5hearing date was then set for 2001 in where she was appointed
attorney.

A waiver hearing occurred on March 9th, preliminary

hearing then was scheduled for March 30th.
Apparently Mr. Bainum was appointed to represent
Ms. Wagenman.

There was another gentleman by the name of

David Facemeyer who pinch hit or substituted for Mr. Bainum at
the preliminary hearing.
conducted.

The preliminary hearing was

At the conclusion of that the case is apparently

continued to April 13th so counsel can be present.

I'm

assuming that refers to Mr. Bainum.
So at that point the matter is set on for April 13th.
From the hearing of April 13th, the Court set the jury trial
for June 4th.

Apparently there was another case where I think

the Court record indicates of a higher priority that was
actually heard, and I don't know what that one was about*
Then that trial was scheduled for June 25, and here we
are today.

Last week while the Court was —

your Honor was on

vacation there was some discussions ongoing between Mr. Buhman
and I, and I think Mr. Buhman decided to call Kari, the court
clerk, and advise her that we did not need a jury on this
because they were not ready to proceed because, I think, last
week Mr. Buhman learned that Mr. Joy was out of town and
basically unavailable.
We think at this point, by the way we calculate it,
April 13th is the date —

excuse me, May 18th would have been
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-6the date that this case would have been required to appear.

I

don't know how the Court wants to deal with the March 30th
date, moving that to April 13th, but even if you do take that
into consideration, we're way beyond the 120 days at this
point.

We think our motion is well made.
THE COURT:

Mr. Buhman, tell me, was your witness

subpoenaed for the trial?
MR. BUHMAN:

Well, we've been in contact with him,

your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. BUHMAN:

Not subpoenaed?
We didn't issue a subpoena because he

notified us that it was a long planned vacation with his
family, so we didn't it was (inaudible) issue a subpoena.

May

I approach?

it.

MR. CARTER:

I think I've included that in my motion.

MR. BUHMAN:

Your Honor, this o n e —

MR. CARTER:

Actually, I think that's in the file.

MR. BUHMAN:

Yeah, this one has an eligible date on

May I approach?
THE COURT:
MR. BUHMAN:

Yes, sir.
Your Honor, on the bottom left corner it

shows the date that this was delivered to the prison.

I think

the statute is quite clear the pertinent date for beginning the
120 days is the date of delivery (inaudible) the prison had
custody of the prisoner.
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1
2

MR. CARTER:

Judge, we don't contest that.

I think

that's correct.

3

MR. BUHMAN:

So it's the 29th of January.

I looked on

4

a calendar, and even with months ending in 28, 29, 30 or 31

5

days, I do believe that the correct ending date would be May

6

29th from this date.

7

outside that 120 days, except that at the preliminary hearing

8

on March 30th, as Mr. Carter mentioned, Ms. Wagenman was

9

represented by David Facemeyer, who was not her appointed

10

So the June 4th date would have been

attorney.

11

At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing the Court

12

bound that over, and Mr. Facemeyer requested additional time to

13

have Mr. Bainum present.

14

trial down.

15

set the trial date at that time.

16 I

So that's a defense motion to set the

We were prepared and indicated we were prepared to

So the law is clear that if the defense makes a motion

17 I to continue or the defense causes a delay, that runs against
18

the defendant and not against the State.

19

maybe that's 14 days.

20

would toll against the defendant.

21

would have been within the 120 days.

22

So those 13 days

—

There's 31 days in March, so 14 days
So the June 4th trial date

On the June 4th trial date the Court bumped the

23

matter.

If the Court has good cause or the prosecution has

24

good cause, depending on what the Court decides, then the Court

25

can extend the 120 days or at any time and not toll against the
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-8State.
So the Court bumping our June 4th, and today we're
requesting a continuance which we believe for good cause.
have a witness who was available on June 4th.
subpoenaed.

He was

We had spoken to him and he was ready to go.

we were ready to go on June 4th.

We

So

The Court set it on the 25th,

which at that time I did not know was not a good day for
Mr. Joy, but he indicated to us on the phone that he was unable
to attend today, as I've mentioned, for a long planned
vacation.
So we believe that the 13 days should toll against the
defendant, and there has been good cause for the Court to
continue the trial on the 4th and good cause today.

So we

think we should be within the 120 days still.
MR. CARTER:

I think one of the real failures here is

the State didn't subpoena their witness, and Mr. Joy is out of
town.

That, I think, works against the State pretty

dramatically.
witness.

My position on it is is this is not a citizen

This is a (inaudible) employee of the State who has

chosen to prioritize a vacation over the speedy rights of the
defendant.
If that was the case, we should have had a more
informal motion to continue and then learning of it at the late
date, and here we are today, and I would like the record to be
clear that we are not the ones that deferred this hearing from
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-9a jury trial today.

It is the State's request because Mr. Joy,

not being subpoenaed and not being here.
MR. BUHMAN:
THE COURT:

May I respond to that, your Honor?
Sure.

MR. BUHMAN:

I'm unaware of any case law that says I

have to issue a subpoena before I can get a good cause for
continuance.

I don't believe there's any case law that

supports that.

I think that all I have to show is that there

is good cause to continue the trial.

There is no (inaudible)

rule that I have to issue a subpoena to require someone to be
here when they have long standing plans.
We inconvenienced Mr. Joy, he didn't do it to us.

He

had scheduled vacation at a time when he would have been
available for the trial.

So it's essentially the State's fault

or the judicial system's fault that we set it on a date when
he's unavailable.
the State.

I don't think that should be held against

These are people —

these are real people that we

deal with in these courtrooios, and they have lives and families
as well.
THE COURT:
MR. CARTER:
THE COURT:

Anything else?
No.
Having looked at your motion, Mr. Carter,

and now hearing from counsel, I'm going to find as follows.
The motion to dismiss is denied for the following reasons:
believe that Mr. Buhman has correctly stated the sequence of
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I

-10events with respect to the creation of the extension of time
beyond May 29th, i.e., the request on behalf of Ms. Wagenman's
former counsel for a hearing that was at counsel's request
it wasn't at the State's and it wasn't at mine —
it from the date that —
continued.

—

to continue

to the date that counsel wanted it

That extended it beyond —

the 13 days extended it

beyond the 29th of May.
In addition, I find that there —

that although I

would like to have seen subpoenas, and although I think your
argument in most instances is probably well taken, it —

if we

had people that are supposed to be here for hearings and don't
show up, Mr. Carter, that's one of the very first things I look
for in the file —

I guess it's just my toilet training —

whether or not people have been subpoenaed.

is

So the State ought

to factor that in in what they do with respect to witnesses.
In this instance, however, because of request of
counsel and the other case being continued for good cause

—

the other trial date being continued for good cause because of
the other case, June 14th is the day on which this case was set
for trial.
MR. CARTER:
THE COURT:

(Inaudible).
That's when the notice went out of the

trial date, the 14th of June.
continued.

It was June 4th.

That had to be

June 14th a new notice was sent of today's date.

So you had to push that 20 days pretty fast to be able to get
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i

-11things on for you, and I find that because of the shortness of
time and the realistic potential of a major conflict with
people's schedules this time of the year, that there is good
cause demonstrated for the absence of the witness for the
purpose of a trial today.
That probably wouldn't hold in 90 percent of the
situations without subpoenas. But where I considered all of
the factors, the totality of everything, and looking a": times
and dates, that is —

those are my conclusions with respect to

the time frames that evolved in this case, the posture that
brings us to where we are today.
MR. CARTER:

So we'll set it for trial.

Judge, I don't have my calendar with me.

Do you mind if I make a phone call to the office just a second?
THE COURT:

I don't.

MR. CARTER:

What days are you looking at?

COURT CLERK:

July 25th.

MR. CARTER:

July 25th?

That's today.

Oh, I mean

July 25th, I'm sorry.
(Mr. Carter calls office to check calendar)
MR. CARTER:
THE COURT:

That will work, Judge.
7/25, 8:30.

Any requested voir dire or

instructions you want me to consider, please file them by July
16th.
MR. BUHMAN:
have my instructions.

Your Honor, just to make sure that you
I think I filed them.
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-12THE COURT:
again.

They're here.

They're here.

Let me just take a look

Anything else, gentlemen, on behalf of

Ms. Wagenman?
MR. CARTER:

No, your Honor.

MR. BUHMAN:

No, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay, thank you very much.
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF UTAH

)
)

COUNTY OF UTAH

)

I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the
State of Utah, do hereby certify:
That the foregoing proceedings were transcribed
under my direction from the electronic tape recording
made of these proceedings.
That this transcript is full, true, and correct
and contains all of the evidence, all of the
objections of Counsel and rulings of the Court and all
matters to which the same relate which were audible
through said tape recording.
I further certify that I am not interested in the
outcome thereof.
That certain parties were not identified in the
record, and therefore the name associated with the
statement may not be the correct name as to the
speaker.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 31st day of
January 2002.
My commission expires:
February 24, 2004
rfUBLIC
residing in Utah County
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FILED 7M/*'
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah Co'inty. P»«*te of Utah
L V I L U ^ „ . O^PUty

SHELDEN CARTER (0»9)
HARRIS & CARTER
Attorney for Defendant
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 375-9801
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY
,
STATEOFUTAH
Plaintiff,

-oooOooo)
)
ORDER DENYING MOTION
)
TO DISMISS
)
(120-Day Disposition)

vs.

)

)
Dayna Wagenman,
Defendant.

CaseNo. 01140381

)
)
-oooOooo-

'

Defendant, Dayna Wageman, through counsel, motioned this Court to
dismiss the information filed herein against said defendant. The motion was
made pursuant to and under the authority of U.C.A. 77-29-1, U.C.A.
Defendant Wagenman was being detained in the Utah State Prison prior
to January 18,2001. She was initially arrested on December 26,2000 and placed
in custody. She was on parole and pursuant to parole hearings she was detained
without bail in the Utah State Prison.
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Said defendant caused on the date of January 18, 2001, to have served a
120-day disposition for Utah County referencing this pending charge. It was
noted as being received by the Utah State Prison on February 1,2001. It was
mailed to the Utah County Attorney on the same date of February 1,2001. The
notice of the 120-Day Disposition was forwarded to the Fourth Judicial District
Court on February 1,2001.
The case originates as a result of her arrest on these accusations on
December 26, 2000. She was held in the Utah County Jail for a period of
approximately one week awaiting initial arraignment in the Fourth Judicial
District Court without bail. The Utah County Attorney was not prepared to
proceed at this time. However, the Utah State Department of Corrections placed
a parole hold upon her. The Utah County Attorney office officially filed the
information accusing the defendant of such criminal conduct on January 26, 2001.
A summons was issued on January 30, 2001. A hearing date was set for March 1,
2001. On said date, an attorney was appointed to represent the defendant. A
copy of the information was given to the defendant on said date. Mr. Craig
Bainum ws appointed to represent her.
A waiver hearing (a hearing conducted to determine whether a
preliminary hearing will be conducted) was set for March 9,2001. A
preliminary hearing was scheduled for March 30,2001. The hearing was
conducted on March 30,2001. Mr. Dana Facemeyer, an attorney working with
Mr. Bainum, appeared for her in substitution for Mr. Bainum. Further
proceedings were then scheduled for April 13, 2001 to allow Mr. Bainum to be
present. At said hearing, a jury trial was then scheduled for June 4, 2001. On
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

June 4, 2001, the trial was continued for another case. The Court continued the
trial on June 4, 2001 from said date to hear State v. Kris Montoya, case No.
001402774. See the docket of Ms Montoya case.
The Wagenman trial was then rescheduled for June 25,2001.
On June 25,2001, the defendant appeared ready for trial. The State sought
a continuance of the trial on said date. The State's motion was based on the fact
that they had not subpoened witnesses to the trial and that the critical witness
(probation officer Kendall Joy) was out-of-state vacationing. The Court granted
the State's motion to continue the June 25,2001 date.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing on this

^ ffiflay of July, 2001, by first-class, U.S. Mail, postage

prepaid to the following:
Utah County Attorney
100 East Center
Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84604
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